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A. Invasion of Privacy
The Minnesota Supreme Court made great strides in
recognizing the tort of invasion of privacy in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., but it left other courts with the task of determining the scope
of the doctrine. In C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,2 the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota interpreted the
"publication of private facts,"3 which is one of three distinct causes
of action falling within Minnesota's invasion of privacy tort. The
court construed the tort's breadth narrowly, adhering to Minnesota
cases preceding Lake.4
In C.L.D., the plaintiff began working in August of 1995 as a
cashier at one of defendant's Wal-Mart stores in Mankato,
Minnesota.5 When she began her employment, plaintiff read and
signed two standard documents setting forth Wal-Mart's
employment policies: The New Associate Form and The Associate
Handbook. The former document outlined the defendant's
policies and practices with regard to new employees, while the
latter document covered Wal-Mart's history, employee training,
employee evaluations, personnel records, and company goals.
Both documents included statements of the defendant's "Open
Door Policy," which was described in the New Associate Form as
1. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). The court recognized three of the four
causes of action found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652A,
including: intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, and
publication of private facts. See id. at 236.
2. 79 F. Supp.2d (D. Minn. 1999).
3. See id. at 1083-86.
4. See id. at 1084-85. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts that
"provides that the term publicity should be construed narrowly." Id. at 1084. In
addition, the court stated that "the majority of state and federal courts to consider
the issue have [done so with a narrow scope]." Id. Finally, the court cited
previous Minnesota cases that considered the tort in dicta and concluded that the
state courts would adopt a narrow definition of the tort, perhaps even narrower
than the Restatement. See id.
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follows: "Wal-Mart has an Open Door Policy which encourages
associates to discuss any matter freely, openly, and in confidence
with their Store manager or other levels of Management. We
encourage you to use this at anytime."8
In addition, the Associate Handbook stated that none of the
policies described in the manual were terms of employment nor
did they result in a contract.9 Plaintiff signed both the New
Associate Form and the Associate Handbook on August 29, 1995,
"thereby acknowledging that she had read and understood them." °
In September 1997, plaintiff learned that she was pregnant
and decided to have an abortion in early October 1996.1 Plaintiff
sought medical leave from work to have the procedure. 2
Specifically, plaintiff requested medical leave from assistant
manager John Enright.5  Enright granted the permission and
plaintiff then "volunteered the fact that she was pregnant and
'losing the baby."' 4  Plaintiff stated that she divulged the
circumstances because "she felt psychological pressure from
Enright to legitimize her request."' 5
Plaintiff contends that when she returned to work three of her
co-workers knew of her pregnancy and abortion.' 6 Plaintiff alleged
that the three employees knew because Enright told them;
although she had no direct evidence to support her contention. 7
In December of 1996, plaintiff voluntarily disclosed her situation to
other employees because she felt the need "to defend herself
against rumors." Soon thereafter in February of 1997 plaintiff
quit herjob.' 9
Plaintiff filed suit for, inter alia, tortious invasion of privacy.'
The Minnesota federal district court, "[1] acking instruction on this
issue from the courts of Minnesota... look[ed] to other sources
8. Id. The Associate Handbook provided substantially the same description.
See id.
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for guidance."21  After looking to the Restatements, other
jurisdictions, and any tendencies from the Minnesota courts, the
court found that plaintiff failed to present a case for invasion of
privacy and therefore granted defendant's summary judgment
22motion. In finding that plaintiff did not present an invasion of
privacy case, the court determined that there was an insufficient
number of people with knowledge to constitute publication, and
that even if there were enough people with knowledge to establish
publication, there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant
publicized the facts.
2
First, the district court looked to see if the private facts were
known by enough people to constitute publication.24  In
determining what would be enough publicity, the court looked to
the Restatement of Torts, which requires that the facts be dispersed
to enough people "that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."
25
Further, the Restatement's comments state "it is not an invasion of
the right of privacy... to communicate a fact concerning the
plaintiff's private life to a single person or even a small group of
persons., 2  The court went on to state that the majority of other
jurisdictions have adopted a substantially similar narrow standard
and that it was thus likely that this would be the standard adopted
27by the Minnesota courts. Indeed, the court pointed to
Minnesota's gre-Lake decisions that also imply a narrow definition
of publicity. Thus, the court concluded that the standard of
publicity in Minnesota is a narrow one, requiring more than
"disclosure to a few individuals" of private facts.29 As a result, the
court held that because only a few people had knowledge of the
plaintiffs abortion, there was no publicity and therefore no
invasion of privacy. 0
Even if the number of persons in the case were sufficient to
21. Id. at 1083.
22. See id. at 1083-85.
23. See id. at 1085.
24. See id. at 1084.
25. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977)).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
27. See C.L.D., 79 F. Supp.2d at 1084.
28. See id. at 1084-85. The court cited Hendry v. Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921,
923 (Minn. 1975), which states that communication to a small number of people is
insufficient to trigger an invasion of privacy tort. See id.
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constitute publicity, the court found that there was insufficient
evidence that the defendant disclosed the private facts to others. 3'
In doing so, the court noted the lack of direct evidence and
pointed to several possible alternatives as to how the private
32information could have leaked out. Thus, the court held that the
mere possibility that the defendant dispersed the information was
not enough to withstand summary judgment. 3
B. Negligence-Property Owners and Trespassing Children
In Croaker v. Mackenhausen,34 the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the Minnesota Court of Appeal's decision and strictly
construed the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 339
requirement that "the possessor of land know or have reason to
know that children are likely to trespass. ,15  In doing so, the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied a more stringent standard,
requiring that the possessor of land must "have reason to anticipate
the presence of the child at the place of danger." 6
In Croaker, tragedy struck when five children were playing in a
van on the defendant's land and they lit a fire in a gasoline canister
that caused an explosion resulting in the death of a three-year-old
and badly burning a five-year-old and eight-year-old.3' The children
were locals who frequently visited the defendant's resort, as did
many other children. On the day in question, the children went
to the resort and, finding the lodge closed, happened upon a van
parked next to a shed.39 After playing in the van awhile, one of the
children slid under the shed's locked door, found a small red
31. See id. "Plaintiff lacks direct evidence that Enright disclosed her
pregnancy and abortion to other Wal-Mart employees, and he flatly denies this
allegation." See id.
32. See id. The court noted that one of plaintiff's roommates, also a co-
worker, could have inferred the plaintiff's circumstances because the plaintiff
"experienced frequent nausea during her pregnancy" and her roommates were
aware of that condition. See id. The court also considered the plaintiffs indiscreet
use of home pregnancy tests, her roommate's interaction with other Wal-Mart
employees, and the fact that plaintiffs medical leave generated rumors. See id.
33. See id.
34. 592 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1999).
35. See id. at 860.
36. See id. at 862 (quoting William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CAL. L.
REv 427, 448 (1959)).
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plastic gas tank, and decided to bring it into the van.40 The child
stuck a piece of paper into the neck of the tank and lit it.4' The
42paper burned for a short time, then the explosion occurred.
Plaintiffs brought the instant suit to recover damages for the
burns.43
At the trial court, the jury found the defendant sixty percentS 44
responsible. The defendants appealed and the court of appeals
affirmed, stating that all five elements of the law at issue were
supported by the evidence.45 In so holding, the court of appeals
continued its practice of applying a looser standard to Restatement
section 339(a), merely requiring the possessor to know of the
children to be in the vicinity of the dangerous condition.46 The
defendants appealed claiming that the court of appeal's standard
does not comport with the law because it did not require the
defendants to know or have reason to know that children might
trespass at the place of the dangerous condition.47 The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed with the defendants.8
In its analysis, the court noted generally that possessors of land






45. See id. at 860. The Restatement (Second) Of Torts section 339 reads:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if: (a)
the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and (b)
the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know
and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk
of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children
because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk
involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made
dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the
condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as
compared with the risk to children involved, and (e) the possessor fails to
exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect
the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs § 339 (1977).
46. See Croaker, 592 N.W.2d at 862.
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requires that five specific conditions must be met before a duty
arises. 50 The court held that "[o] ur past decisions make it clear that
we strictly construe the requirement that the possessor of land
know or have reason to know that children are likely to trespass."5 '
As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of
51appeal's holding. Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court strictly
applied the language of section 339(a), thereby requiring the
defendant's knowledge or reason to have knowledge that the
51children were likely to trespass on the defendant's property.
Therefore, the defendants owed the plaintiffs no duty simply
because the defendants knew children to be "in the vicinity" of the
dangerous condition.54
C. Legal Malpractice Statute of Limitations
The occurrence-based statute of limitations for legal
malpractice claims is alive and well after Herrmann v. McMenomy &
Severson. Resisting a nudge from the court of appeals to a adopt a
"discovery rule" statute of limitations, 56 the Minnesota Supreme
Court continued its long history of ruling that the statute of
limitations for legal malpractice begins to run "at the time of the
first prohibited transaction" made by the plaintiffs upon the
attorney's advice.57
In Herrmann, plaintiff sued after he incurred significant federal
excise taxes and interest from a prohibited transaction
581recommended to him by the defendants, a law firm. Plaintiff
entered into the prohibited transaction on October 7, 1987, and
became aware of its prohibited nature in May of 1993.' 9 On May
10, 1996, the IRS assessed the penalties and on October 31, 1996,
the client filed suit. 60
50. See id. at 862.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 862 n.4.
53. See id. at 862-63.
54. See id.
55. 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999).
56. "Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run on the
date when the plaintiff knew or should have know of the existence of the cause of
action." Id. at 643 n.16.
57. See id. at 644.
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The district court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion finding that the action accrued in 1987 and thus was time-
barred due to Minnesota's six-year statute of limitations for legalS 61
malpractice claims. The court of appeals reversed, finding that
the action did not accrue until 1993 because "the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the harm manifests itself in
some form or the client otherwise suffers pecuniary lOSS.
6
1
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused the
Minnesota Court of Appeals "adopt[ion of a] discovery rule for
determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for legal• . 1 • 63
malpractice action based on negligent advice." The plaintiff
argued "that it would be unfair to commence the running of that
statute of limitations before 1993... because [he] did not have any
knowledge of the illegality of the transactions . . . . 64 Nonetheless,
the Minnesota Supreme Court stated it has a long history of
"declining to adopt the discovery rule ... and neither [the
plaintiffs] argument nor the court of appeal's decision provide any
justification for [adopting a discovery rule] now.,
65
D. Negligence-Duty to Protect
In Gilbertson v. Leininger,66 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that hosts did not have a special relationship with a houseguest and
67owed no duty to protect her from harm. In Gilbertson, three
friends (the plaintiff and two defendants) had a Thanksgiving
dinner at the defendants' home. Over the course of the evening,
the plaintiff consumed one bottle of wine and one beer.69 The
plaintiff stayed overnight on the defendants' couch and in the
morning the defendants noticed that the plaintiff had some dried70
blood under her nose. In addition, the defendants noticed that
61. See id.
62. See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 583 N.W.2d 283, 292 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998), rev'd, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1941).
63. Herrmann, 590 N.W.2d at 643.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999).
67. See id. at 130-32. The court implied that if the injury were apparent and
the defendants were not reasonable in their care, then a legal duty would arise.
See id. at 131-32 n.2.
68. See id. at 128.
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the plaintiff had both urinated and defecated in her pants." A few
hours later the defendants noticed some blood on the pillow and
blanket that the plaintiff had used.72 Another few hours passed and
the plaintiff had still not cleaned herself.7 3  At this time the
defendants began to worry that something was wrong and called a
nurse.74 The nurse told them not to worry, but the defendants
called 911 a short time later.75 The plaintiff was diagnosed with a
subdural hematoma and a skull fracture.76
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, claiming that
they owed her a duty of protection after she was injured.7 7 A jury
agreed and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court
found that the defendants did not have a special relationship with
the plaintiff and, therefore, owed her no duty. 79 The court noted
that "[a] person generally has no duty to act for the protection of
another [and t] he existence of a legal duty to act depends on two
factors: (1) the relationship of the parties, and (2) the forseeability
of the risk involved."° In order to find a relationship satisfying the
first element, "it must be assumed that the harm to be prevented by
the defendant is one that 'the defendant is in a position to protect
against and should be expected to protect against.'
The plaintiff claimed that she placed herself in the
defendants' custody and thus was deprived of normal opportunities
for self-protection. 82  The court disagreed, finding that the
defendants did not have physical custody of plaintiff nor did they
83accept responsibility for plaintiff's health . In addition, the court
stated that the defendants could not be expected to detect the
seriousness of the problem and thus call for help much sooner





75. See id. at 129-30.
76. See id. at 130.
77. See id. at 128.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 130.
81. See id. at 131 (quoting Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168
(Minn. 1989)).
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85. See id. at 132.
9
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